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1. Introduction 
Indonesia has experienced rapid agricultural growth from 1960 onwards (Hill, 2000; Mundlak et al., 
2002; Timmer, 2007). Between 1961 and 1998 the compound average annual growth rate stood at 
3.4% in the aggregate and 1.4% in per capita terms (Mundlak et al., 2002). This growth was marked 
by a significant expansion of land used, the adoption of new technologies such as irrigation, 
fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds and changes in land use patterns including an increasing 
cultivation of various cash crops including coffee and cocoa (Mundlak et al., 2002). We explore 
some of the drivers underlying this growth in one part of Indonesia, Central Sulawesi. We focus in 
particular on land tenure institutions and the adoption of formal land titles which we partly explain 
by internal migration induced population pressure. We also analyze the role of land titles in 
facilitating a more efficient resource allocation and hence higher agricultural productivity.  
A particular strength of our study is that it is based on a very detailed data set consisting of 
village survey covering more than 20 years of socio-economic change and a household data set, 
albeit cross-sectional, but with plot level information. Since the data is observational in nature we 
cannot derive causal relationships but, based on village fixed effects and household fixed effects 
regressions, provide evidence for a set of hypotheses linking migration, the adoption of land tiles 
and agricultural growth. Despite the spatially confined empirical setting, which of course has the 
advantage of allowing us to operate with very homogenous initial conditions, there is a large 
heterogeneity in migration flows, the emergence of land titles in villages, investments in land, and 
the adoption of new technologies. Studying the determinants of this heterogeneity is the central 
contribution of our article.  
By demonstrating the empirical relevance of our proposed transmission mechanisms, we 
believe that we are not only able to contribute to the literature on the emergence and effects of land 
rights, but are also able to provide critical details on the emergence and relevance of local 
institutions more generally which complements the more macroeconomic and historical studies 
explaining long run differences in economic development across countries (Engerman and Sokoloff, 
1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; 
Galor et al., 2009). We believe there is value-added to examine the transmission mechanisms 
implied by the institutions hypothesis at the micro level in the more homogenous setting of a single 
country, where concerns about parameter heterogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity are arguably 
less serious than with cross-country regressions. Moreover, the macroeconomic literature is 
typically relatively silent about the precise nature of the relevant institutions, how exactly these 
institutions emerged and how they shaped the pattern of economic development.
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Our analysis suggests that increased population pressure enhanced the demand for formal land 
titles that were accessible through a land titling scheme supplied by the Government. These patterns 
are also consistent with the idea that in villages were such titles were in use, agricultural inputs were 
used more intensively and investment, such as tree planting, terracing and building ditches and 
irrigation systems were enhanced. This is in contrast to some studies that have analyzed the role of 
land titles in particular in the African context (e.g. Braselle, 2002; Jacoby and Minten, 2007) but 
also confirms what has been found in other regions such as China (e.g. Deininger and Jin, 2003), 
India (e.g. Deininger et al. 2007) or Vietnam (e.g. Do and Iyer, 2008). The intention of our study is 
neither to downplay the negative findings nor to overemphasize the positive findings but rather to 
elaborate on a few factors that can explain why in our context overall land titles seem to have 
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played a rather positive role. Moreover, given the narrow regional focus, we do not pretend to 
generate findings that are valid without further testing beyond that particular context.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related 
literature and derive some hypotheses that guide our empirical analysis. In Section 3 we describe 
the context and the different data sets used for the empirical analysis. In Section 4 we present and 
discuss the results of our empirical analysis. In Section 5 we conclude. 
 
2. Land tenure, property rights and agricultural development: a brief review 
We focus in this review on two aspects. First, the role of property rights for land for agricultural 
investment, both theoretically and empirically, and, second, on the emergence and the evolution of 
formal land rights. 
In the theoretical literature, the use of formal land rights is typically associated with three 
types of effects (see e.g. Feder and Feeny, 1991; Besley, 1995; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; Feder 
and Nishio, 1999; Platteau, 2000; Place 2009). First, formal land rights are assumed to increases the 
return on long-term land improvements and conservation measures and therefore farmers are 
expected to have a higher incentive to undertake investments (the ‘assurance effect’). If perennial 
crops such as coffee and cocoa are gaining prominence as the most lucrative cash crops, as has been 
the case in the area we investigate (Klasen, Rudolf, and Priebe, 2013), this effect is potentially 
particularly important. Second, with formal land rights it is easier to sell or rent the land and thus to 
realize improvements made through investments enhancing such investments (the ‘realizability 
effect’). Third, formal land titles enable its holders to use land as collateral, which in turn facilitates 
access to credit and enables the farmer to finance investments in fertilizer and pesticides in the short 
term (which often have to be financed up-front) and  tree planting, the construction of terraces or an 
irrigation system in the long-term (the ‘collateralisation effect’). 
Analyzing the relationship between land rights and productive agricultural investments 
empirically is a major challenge as one needs to control for the possible endogeneity of land rights 
with respect to investment in land and the adoption of new technologies. Studies that have 
addressed in one way or another endogeneity problems show mixed results ranging from positive 
(see e.g. Bandiera, 2007; Deininger and Jin, 2003; Deininger et al., 2007; Feder, 2007; Do and 
Yyer, 2008; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Holden et al., 2009; Deininger et al., 2011; Ali et al., 2011) 
to heterogeneous, partly insignificant if not negative effects (see e.g. Besley, 1995; Otsuka et al., 
2003; Braselle, 2002; Jacoby and Minten, 2007; Van den Broeck et al., 2007).
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In those cases were formalized land titles did not have positive or even had negative effects, 
the failure is typically related to the lack of conditions that would enable one or several of the 
effects discussed above to work. Moreover the potential of traditional institutions to allocate land, to 
deal with land disputes, and to provide security to farmers are often underestimated. And finally not 
enough attention is given to implementation flaws and the costs of land titling programs and the 
equity issues that are associated with such programs. 
In fact the literature suggests  that formalization is particularly attractive where traditional 
tenure systems are weak and unable to generate sufficient tenure security, where land is getting 
increasingly scarce, when the return on investment in land is high, opportunities for productive 
agricultural investments exist, and where collaterized lending exist (e.g. Platteau. 1996; Bromley, 
2008). These conditions are likely to apply in many regions in Latin America and Asia, including 
our study region, and some regions of Sub-Saharan Africa where land is increasingly scarce, but 
less so in many other parts of relatively land-abundant Sub-Saharan Africa.  In many of those 
African settings, poorly implemented top-down land titling reforms in conjunction with weak 
administrative capacity, the lack of investment opportunities and appropriate technical innovations 
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for land-intensive agriculture and relatively well-functioning informal institutions governing land 
access can explain the mixed evidence of the effects of land titling there. In such contexts land 
tenure policies ignoring the complex rules of locally evolved property institutions can even lead to 
more conflict and a loss of social cohesion, particularly if marginalized groups are excluded from 
the process of land regulation or in an extreme small elites even dominate the process (see e.g. 
Bruce, 1986; Migot-Adholla, 1991; Platteau, 1996, 2000; Sjaastad and Bromley, 2000; Bromley, 
2008; Place, 2009).  
Another closely related strand of the literature deals with the question whether formal land 
titles are an inevitable outcome of rising pressure on land resources. This is proposed by the so 
called ‘Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights’ (ETLR, hereafter).4 The proponents of the ETLR 
compare institutional change to technological change and hence base their argument on the induced 
innovation hypothesis, according to which disequilibria on the factor markets caused for instance by 
rapid population growth or increased commercialization of agriculture lead to an enhanced 
innovation and adoption of existing innovation of agricultural technology (Boserup, 1965; Hayami 
and Ruttan, 1985; North 1981). Since formal land titles cannot directly evolve out of customary 
land rights the ETLR assumes that governments realize in time ‘the need’ for formal land titles and 
provide land titles once land is scarce (Platteau, 1996). 
The ETLR is criticized for many of its underlying assumptions. Platteau (1996) for instance 
points out that it is unlikely that there is a massive and homogenous demand for formal land titles as 
some people will always realize that they lose through land reform. Feder and Feeny (1991) 
emphasize the role of cultural factors, which may prevent the demand for land titles to develop. A 
transfer of land to a person from another clan or ethnic group may represent a violation of cultural 
norms which is not accepted. Another often mentioned problem is that even if there has been 
agreement on laws to provide formal land titles, the required subsequent registration and 
enforcement mechanisms are often absent and difficult to establish (Feder and Feeny, 1991). 
Finally, even if there is a broad-based agreement that some sort of land titling is needed, people 
may see the greater potential in the evolution of indigenous land tenure systems towards 
individualization (Bruce, 1988, 1993; Migot-Adholla, 1991).  
The case we describe is interesting in the sense that the supply of land titles was indeed 
exogenously provided throughout the entire observation period including the institutional structures 
needed to manage formal land rights over time, although obviously not without smaller failures. 
Hence, our study does not deal with the critical element of supply. We focus entirely on the 
conditions that enhanced demand. While the commercialization of agriculture certainly played a 
role, we think a major force was migration-induced population pressure and conflict about land. We 
also provide suggestive evidence that once land rights were there they enhanced agricultural 
intensification and investment (rather the other way around). These, at least on average, positive 
effects may have materialized because of a favorable context: land was increasingly scarce, 
conflicts emerged, traditional allocation mechanisms were no longer functioning well, there were 
enough agricultural investment opportunities and sufficient access to credit and input markets so 
that land titles could generate the three positive effects described above. However, the qualitative 
field research that we conducted, revealed that, not surprisingly, some lost from the titling in the 
village, in particular those who hastily sold their land because of (temporarily) economic hardship. 
In sum, we look at two links in our empirical analysis. First, the effect of migration-induced 
population pressure on formal land titles and, second, the effect of formal land titles on agricultural 
expenses, in particular the purchase of inputs and on agricultural investment. Again, our data does 
not allow making any strong causal claims, but we think the data is good and original enough to 
tease out those factors which in our case ensured that the adoption of formal land titles promoted 
agricultural development.  
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 A close antecedent to our work, also studying Indonesia is Quisumbing and Otsuka (2001), 
but they analyze the effects of changes in customary land tenure institutions on agricultural 
productivity, cropland management and investment in Sumatra. As we do they also explored the 
factors affecting the changes in these land tenure institutions; instead, we focus in our study on the 
adoption of formal institutions and their effects.  
 
3 Data and study context 
3.1 Data  
The longitudinal village level data set we use was collected during March to July in 2001 in the 
Lore Lindu region. This region includes the Lore Lindu National Park and the five surrounding sub-
districts. It is situated south of Palu, the provincial capital of Central Sulawesi/Indonesia. For the 
survey 80 of the 119 villages in the region were selected using a stratified random sampling method 
(Zeller, Schwarze and van Rheenen, 2002). The survey collected data on current and past 
demographics, land use practices and technology adoption, conflicts and the implementation of land 
rights, conservation issues, infrastructure and qualitative information on income and well-being. 
Additional information on geographic features was taken from secondary data sources and added to 
the data set by Maertens, Zeller and Birner (2006). It is important to note that the retrospective 
information on population size, migration, land rights and so on was taken from administrative 
records available in each village. Therefore this information is very reliable and not affected by 
recall bias. Interviews were held not only with the village leader but also with other persons who 
had good knowledge about the surveyed village.  
Yet, to further substantiate our findings, we make also use of household survey data which 
was collected within the same research program mentioned above. In 13 out of the 80 villages 
covered by the village survey, a representative sample of 318 households were interviewed in 2001 
regarding their activities, the acquisition and possession of land, land rights and land use practices. 
The information on agriculture is recorded on the level of plots allowing for a very detailed analysis 
of the relationship between household characteristics, land rights, investment and output.  In 
particular, different plots of the same household can have different land rights so that we are able to 
explore differences in the link between land rights and differences in agricultural expenses and 
planting decisions across different plots for the same household.   
 
3.2 Economic activity 
The Lore Lindu region is rural. 87% of the 33,000 households living in the region depend 
economically on agriculture. 15% of the total area—excluding the National Park—is used for 
agricultural production. The rest of the area is mainly grasslands and forests. The principal food 
crop is paddy or sawah rice (‘sawah’ means wet rice field). Important cash crops are cocoa and 
coffee. Households mainly operate as smallholders (see Maertens et al., 2006). Logging is either 
done informally, mainly for land conversion and not for selling the wood, or is done formally but 
then by companies from outside the Lore Lindu Region and has then only a marginal or even no 
impact on local incomes; compared to the rest of Indonesia (and other tropical forests), 
deforestation rates are, in any case, relatively low (see e.g. Erasmi and Priess, 2007). 
Table 1 shows that the average population size per village was 730 in 1980 and increased to 
1,100 in 2001. The average size of land used for agricultural production per village was 340 ha in 
1980 and increased to 510 ha in 2001. The development of the land use pattern over time shows that 
a relatively stable share of 40 percent is used for paddy rice. The average share allocated to cash 
crops ― cocoa, coffee and coconuts ― increased from 25 percent to 46 percent over time reducing 
the share of land allocated to corn and other crops. The last column of Table 1 shows also the means 
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for the sub-sample of the 13 villages covered by the household survey. While these villages are on 
average a bit larger than the total sample of villages, there are quite similar in terms of their land use 
patterns. 
[please insert Table 1] 
The statistics on infrastructure availability and housing conditions suggest that on average the 
villages in the study region experienced substantial improvements in their living standards over the 
period 1980 to 2001 which went along with population growth and an increased cultivation of 
perennial crops, though with important differences across villages. As the statistics in Tables 1 and 
2 show, there is also great deal of heterogeneity in terms of access and use of technologies and 
investments in land between and within these villages, and across time. In particular, the use of 
modern seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides rose across all villages, but at different speeds and with great 
heterogeneity.  It is this heterogeneity that we will exploit in our empirical analysis. 
 
3.3 Migration, population growth and population density 
During the past decades a significant part of the immigration into the study region has taken place 
from the south and middle-west of Sulawesi to the north-east of the Lore Lindu region, in particular 
to the districts of Palolo, Sigi Biromaru and Lore Utara.
5
 Some immigration has also taken place 
within so called ‘transmigration programs’, organized by the government mainly during the 1960s 
and 1970s. These programs resettled people in particular from the islands Java, Bali and Lombok in 
Central-Sulawesi. The places were chosen according to factors such as soil fertility and land 
availability (Faust, Maertens, Weber et al., 2003). Most of these migrants have today returned and 
the programs are seen as having failed and were stopped with the demise of the ‘New Order’ regime 
of former president Suharto. In our sample none of the villages was affected by these programs 
during the 1980s, but three villages were affected during the period 1990-2001 and we decided to 
remove these three villages from our sample. That means we work throughout the article with a 
sample of 77 villages. None of the removed villages was part of the household survey.  
Table 1 shows that annual net population growth across the villages, i.e. natural population 
growth plus the balance of in and out-migration, averaged around 2.1 to 2.3 percent over the period 
1980 to 2001. Yet, the variance is large with a number of villages showing negative population 
growth and many villages having annual population growth rates as high as 10 percent. The annual 
net migration rate defined here as the difference of immigrating and emigrating households over a 
given period divided by the number of households in the village at the beginning of that period was 
on average 2.2 percent during the period 1980 to 1990, 1.2 percent during the period 1990 to 1995 
and 1.4 percent during the period 1995 to 2001. Finally, the share of migrant households averaged 
between 14 and 18 percent over the period of study, but again with a large variance across villages. 
Given these demographic forces, population density, measured by population size per hectare of 
used and unused agricultural land (i.e. land that has been cleared for agricultural production), 
increased on average from 1.2 to 1.8. Here as well the variance is large across villages. 10 out of the 
13 villages covered by the household survey are situated in the three above-mentioned districts that 
were preferred destinations by migrants. This is reflected by a higher average net immigration rate, 
a slightly higher share of migrants and a higher population density in these villages.  
 
3.4 Land tenure and land rights  
Land tenure systems are quite heterogeneous in Indonesia and some historical background is 
required to understand their evolution over time. The land tenure system has experienced a 
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substantial change in 1953 when land ownership went from the ‘swaprajas’ (local ‘kingdoms’) to 
the state. A few years later, in 1960, the ‘Basic Agrarian Law’ was passed that allowed for the 
individual titling of land.  The National Land Agency was created and in charge of organizing the 
titling process.  This agency has a decentralized structure so that actual records are kept at local 
offices throughout Indonesia.  The law allowed for the titling of land and promised, in principle, a 
titling of all land in Indonesia. However, this was implemented at a very slow pace, so that by the 
mid-90s only about 7-10 percent of land was titled (see Safitri, 2009; Slaats et al., 2009; Reering 
and van Gender, 2010). The outer islands of Indonesia, such as Sulawesi, were hardly covered.  To 
circumvent this problem of the failure of government to follow through on titling, individuals were 
allowed to register individually parcels of land with the National Land Agency.  This process is, 
however, very expensive and cumbersome as the applicant has to bear the full costs of the titling 
and has to ensure to get agreement from potential other claimants as well as the village leader that 
this claim is valid. As a result, the process has become de facto demand-driven with individuals or 
groups of individuals applying for land to be titled.  In order to speed up the titling process, the 
PRONA and PRODA programs were instituted in 1981; PRONA at the national level, and PRODA 
at the district level.  PRONA/PRODA subsidize the cost of titling, particularly for poorer 
households.  Thus the process essentially remained the same, but was now much cheaper for 
claimants but for Indonesian standards still substantial (about 250,000 rupees per plot, roughly 80 
intl. $ at PPP).  These PRONA/PRODA certificates are held by the local offices of the National 
Land Agency. The titles provide ownership rights to land holders, including the right to transfer the 
land through sell, rent, bequeath, pledge, mortgage and gift.  In principle the program also offers the 
option to title the entire village land together. However, given the difficulties and costs of the 
process, the limited budget of the program, this happens only occasionally and did not happen in the 
villages we focus on. Next to these formal titles, which we refer to as government titles, there exist 
also informal titles as still many people find the costs of titling too high and procedures too 
cumbersome.  As a result, villagers resort to using letters from the village head, sale contracts, and 
similar evidence as informal titles which tend to be enforced and adjudicated by the village leaders.  
Regarding the government land titles, it is the responsibility of the title holder to report to the 
National Land Agency any change in the title status (e.g. sale of land, etc.). When titled land is sold 
this change is usually made. This involves again a fee to be paid to the National Land Agency. 
However, if a certificate stays within a family (e.g. is inherited) then the change is usually not 
registered.  But it is important to note that the village leaders usually have good sense of up-to-date 
titles as they issue letters substituting for titles and provide information in case of conflicts over 
land. And they clearly recognize the government titles as firm proof of titling. 
In our study region formal land titles became more and more widespread in the 1980s and 
1990s (see also Nuryartono, 2005). Table 1 shows that the share of villages in which legal 
government land titles exist increased from 9 percent in 1980 to 63 percent in 2001. 85 percent of 
the villages covered by the household survey data have land titles. In 90 percent of all cases land 
titling was done under the PRONA/PRODA scheme. Our data set comprises the share of 
households with such formal ownership rights only for the year 2001. It is on average 26 percent, 
but in some villages as high as 75 percent. Table 2 shows that out of the 1,326 plots cultivated by 
the 318 sampled households, 445 plots are titled (33.6 percent). 43 percent of these titles correspond 
to legal government titles ― including those obtained under PRONA/PRODA. In 11 percent of the 
plots the title consists of a purchasing contract and in 23 percent the title is a letter from the village 
leader. The remaining 23 percent of plots have other types of titles which are not further specified in 
the data set. According to villagers these are basically written agreements by the concerned persons 
that land has changed the owner.  
[please insert Table 2] 
Most plots were acquired through inheritance (29 percent), purchase (23 percent) and clearing 
forest (17 percent). The rest was obtained as a gift, through marriage or alike. Acquiring land by 
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clearing forest became more and more difficult over time due to the implementation of laws and 
regulations aimed at protecting the rainforest, including a prohibition of logging activities inside the 
National Park (see Schwarze et al., 2009). Hence, land expansion through the clearance of forest 
has clear limits. But where it happens, it usually implies the absence of any land title or land 
certificate. It is important to note that purchasing land does not mean automatically getting a formal 
land title or even a contract. In the villages we study, about 50 percent of all purchased plots are 
without such titles. 
Migrants usually buy land from local villagers or the village leader or, in some cases, simply 
get land or a piece of forest to clear from the village leader by making a small gift. This is again 
often (in more than 80 percent of the cases) done without any legal land transfer and land certificate 
(Nuryartono, 2005). Indeed in our data set, the share of plots lacking titles does not significantly 
differ between migrants and locals. If the more narrow definition of ‘government titles’ is used, 
locals have even slightly more often land rights than migrants.  
If no legal land title is issued, land tenure security for migrants is in our study region usually 
very low and it often means that land can only be used for a limited period of time. Even a letter of 
temporary land-use rights issued by the village leader is not powerful enough to avoid land conflicts 
in the future (Nuryartono, 2005). This again suggests that there is a hierarchy of tenure security 
which is highest for legal government titles, and lower for most other forms of titles; given the 
heterogeneity of non-government titles and the circumstances under which they were issued, it will 
be largely an empirical question to what extent they serve as a close substitute to these formal 
government titles.  We hypothesize, however, that any form of title will enhance tenure security in 
this dynamic environment, compared to existing informal customary land access. 
The village survey asked village leaders also regarding the occurrence of conflicts about land 
rights in the village. As Table 1 shows such conflicts seem to occur quite frequently. Out of the 77 
villages, 55 villages reported conflicts among native households in the village, 18 reported conflicts 
between native households and migrants, 35 reported conflicts with households residing in other 
villages and 21 reported conflicts with governmental or other institutions.  
 
4. Migration and changes in land tenure arrangements 
In this section we analyze whether migration and the associated pressure on land enhance land 
titling. For this purpose, we rely first on the village level data, but use in a second step also the 
household survey data to further substantiate our findings. 
 
4.1 Evidence from the village level data 
As explained above in the data section, the village level data consists of information about the year 
2001 and retrospective information back to 1980. Some of our variables of interest are available 
quasi continuously. For instance, we know in which year formal land titles emerged and hence can 
code for each year and each village whether formal land titles existed or not in any year during this 
period. For other variables we only have information for the years 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2001. This 
is for example the case for the demographic information. A few variables are only available for the 
year 2001, such as the share of households having formal land titles in a village. Hence, wherever 
possible we rely on a panel estimator covering the years 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2001. If panel 
estimation is not possible, we rely on an analysis of the 2001 cross-section. 
In order to analyze whether migration enhances land titling at the village level, we specify the 
following econometric equation: 
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1 , (1) 
where Rit is a dichotomous variable which takes the value one if legal government titles (formal 
ownership rights) for land exist in village i at time t. The household survey data does not allow 
distinguishing other types of land titles, such as informal or traditional land titles. This issue will be 
addressed in the next sub-section below using the household survey data. Mit-1 stands for the 
average annual net migration rate.
6
 The time-lagged index indicates that we link past migration to 
present land rights, i.e. for instance whether migration between 1980 and 1990 has had an effect on 
the existence of land rights in 1990. 
The vector Xit stands for a set of time-varying village control variables. In Xit we include for 
instance population density, since we think migration bears a higher potential for land conflicts than 
natural population growth alone, thus it should be significant even when controlling for population 
density. We also control for village infrastructure as this may have an impact on the marginal 
productivity of land, and thus determine migration and land titling simultaneously. However, there 
is a risk that infrastructure is correlated with the same unobservables as land titling thus raising a 
potential endogeneity problem. To show that this does not affect our estimates, we estimate 
Equation (1) with and without infrastructure as controls.  
The panel structure also allows including village-fixed effects (λRi) and year dummies (Tt). 
That means we can control for all unobserved factors which are constant within villages across 
time, such as land form, soil quality and historical background characteristics, which might be 
correlated with migration flows and institutional change.
7
 The period-specific effects allow us to 
control for temporal shocks which are constant across villages, such as country-wide or province-
specific policy reforms and macro-economic shocks. The error term in Equation (1) is denoted υRit. 
To avoid an incidental parameters problem, we use a simple linear probability fixed-effects model 
using the within regression estimator. However, the results below also hold if a probit model with 
random effects is used. 
Column (1) in Table 3 shows that increased immigration is strongly associated with the 
existence of land rights. The estimated coefficient suggests that an increase in the net migration rate 
to a village by 10 percentage points (which is within the range of observed differentials in migration 
rates) is associated with an increased probability of the existence of formal land titles in the village 
by about 4.3 percent. In Columns 2 to 5 we include various control variables which do not 
substantially change the association between migration and land rights. Moreover, column (4) 
shows that natural population growth does not appear to have any impact on the existence of land 
rights, this suggests that it is migration-induced population pressure and not population pressure per 
se that leads to land titling. Again, we think, as we explained in Section 2, migration usually means 
new agricultural households (and not just the extension of existing households) and bears a higher 
conflict potential than just natural population growth.
8
  
[please insert Table 3] 
We also tested whether being at the border of the rainforest in interaction with time had any 
effect on land titling (not reported in Table 3). Given that, as mentioned above, during the period of 
                                                          
6
 It should be noted that we take here the household as the observation unit and not the individual, since rural-rural 
migration is in this context usually household migration. 
7
 We believe that for our purposes, the fixed effect specification is best as discussed above.  We also perform the usual 
statistical tests (esp. the Hausman test) to test whether random effects might be preferred as it is the more efficient 
estimator.  The choice of fixed versus random effects has no significant effects on the results. 
8
 Regarding the specification in column (5) note that, as we argue below, land use patterns, including the decision to 
cultivate cash crops may respond to formal land titles, in the sense that land titles provide an incentive to invest in 
coffee and cocoa trees and thus have to be considered as endogenous. Thus the coefficients in column (5) of the effect 
of cash crop production should be treated with caution; our preferred specification is thus in column (3). We include the 
regression with crop choices merely to show that a possibly bi-directional correlation is not affecting our central results. 
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study more and more rainforest protection rules and laws emerged, it could be that land conversion 
became particularly difficult in villages at the rainforest margin and that therefore in these villages 
land scarcity became a more important problem and land titling more likely. However, border-time 
interactions were not significant and thus were dropped from the list of included control variables. 
This also seems again to indicate that population growth as such is not the driver of change in land 
rights. 
As we have explained above the data set includes some other variables which are potentially 
interesting for our analysis, but which are not available for different years and can thus only be 
analyzed using the cross-sectional dimension of the data. This set includes the prevalence of 
conflicts about land, the availability of unused agricultural land for paddy rice and inequality in the 
distribution of land. They can all be seen as proxy variables for the pressure on land. In particular a 
high inequality in the distribution of land may imply that many households have very little or no 
land and this may - especially in the presence of demographic growth - increase the pressure on 
land. More generally, high inequality in land may lead to political and social instability and enhance 
conflicts over land. We analyzed these factors and also considered estimations where we use the 
share of households in a village having formal land titles as the dependent variable (instead of the 
binary land title variable, results not shown here). They are fully consistent with the findings in 
Table 3. They show that an increase in the share of migrants, conflicts about land and land 
inequality are all associated with a higher probability of formal land titles adoption. Conversely, in 
villages where lots of unused land is still available formal land titles are less often adopted (see 
Table A1). 
Although we have relied above on an appropriate lag-structure and used a fixed-effects 
estimator and thus controlled for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time, we cannot, 
based on the above estimations, fully rule out that reverse causality is not an issue, i.e. prospective 
migrants chose destinations according to the possibility to register newly acquired land. To 
investigate this possibility, we also estimated a regression where land rights in t is on the left hand 
side and migration in t+1 on the right hand side. The result is shown in Column (6). It turns out that 
future migration is negatively related to the existence of land titles in a village. This also suggests 
that past migration rather discourages future migration. This is of course a very rudimentary test, 
but it makes it very unlikely that the found correlations are dominated by migration flows that 
positively respond to the existence of land titles. Moreover, the found correlations do not depend on 
whether we take the gross or the net immigration rate, whether we look at the eighties or the 
nineties or whether we add further controls.  
Another issue which may bias our results is that migrants frequently acquire land by 
purchasing it and this may make it more likely that land is formally registered. We now use the 
household survey data to investigate this issue further. It allows us in particular to focus on the land 
title status of plots held by non-migrant households conditional on the level of past migration into 
the village.  
 
4.1.2 Evidence from the household survey data 
Using the household survey data we now test whether the share of migrants in a village increases 
the probability that a plot is titled controlling for migrant status of the household head. We also 
estimate this relationship on a sub-sample of non-migrants. If the share of migrants in the village is 
positive and significant, we can take this at least as suggestive evidence that migration-induced 
population pressure makes land titling more likely. We specify the following probit model: 
)()1Pr( ''' RijpRijpRijRijiRijp PXMSMR   , (2) 
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where Rijp is a binary variable taking the value 1 if plot p of household j in village i is titled. With 
the household level data we now distinguish two types of land titles: formal government land titles 
(‘government land titles’ hereafter), these correspond to those we consider on the village level and a 
broader set of land titles which includes also purchasing contracts, letters by the village chief and 
other certificates (‘land titles’ hereafter). As discussed above, these titles are rather heterogeneous; 
some may grant similar security and functions as government title, while others might be less 
valuable.   
Mi stands for the share of migrants in village i, which should measure the migration-induced 
pressure on land. MSij stands for the migration status of the household head. We distinguish four 
categories: household head is a migrant, the household head’s parents were migrants, the household 
head’s grandparents were migrants and none of these, i.e. neither the household head, nor his or her 
parents or grandparents were migrants. Xij is a vector of household and household head 
characteristics, e.g. gender of the household head. Pijp is a vector of plot characteristics including a 
self-assessment of the soil quality by the household head, and the log size of the plot. The error term 
is denoted εRijp. We do not include household or village fixed-effects as this would then not allow 
analyzing the impact of the household head’s migration status and the isolated impact of the share 
of migrants in the village on the probability of plot titling. Descriptive statistics for the variables we 
use here are presented in Table 2. 
[please insert Table 4] 
The results in Table 4 (columns (1) and (2)) suggest, in line with our hypothesis, that the share 
of migrants in the village is indeed associated with a higher probability that a plot is titled. The 
marginal effect evaluated at the sample means indicates that an increase of the share of migrants in 
a village by 10 percentage points (again, well within the range of actual observations) increases the 
probability that a plot has some form of a land title by 4.3 percent and the probability that a plot has 
an official government title by 2.6 percent. These effects are significant at the 5 percent level and 
they also hold and show a similar order of magnitude if we restrict the estimation to the sub-sample 
of non-migrant households (columns (3) and (4)), showing that the effect between the share of 
migrants in the village and the probability of finding titled plots is not driven by the fact that 
migrants may have more often than non-migrants formal land titles as they often have to buy their 
land. In line with our argument it rather suggests that more migrants mean more pressure on land, 
more conflicts over land and hence a higher propensity to adopt formal land titles. The share-of-
migrants-effect also remains significant if further plot characteristics are introduced as control 
variables such as soil quality and the log of plot size (columns (5) and (6)). It should also be noted 
that although first generation migrants are more likely to have some type of land rights, often a 
purchase contract, but they are not more likely than locals to have a formal government title. 
Households in which the parents of the household head came as migrants to the village, have even a 
clearly lower probability of having land titles.
9
  
 
5. Changes in land tenure arrangements and investments in land and agricultural 
technologies 
We now turn to estimating the effects of land titles on agricultural investments. We first rely on our 
household survey data. Expenditure for inputs, investment decisions and to some extent also the 
adoption of new technologies are rather individual decisions, hence, the problem is better treated by 
                                                          
9
 Surprisingly, third generation migrants, i.e. households, in which the grand-parents came as migrants to the village 
have again a higher probability of having land titles. However, only 1.8 percent of all plots (24 cases) fall into this 
category and hence one should be cautious in interpreting this effect, but it might suggest that on the one hand these 
households still face a higher potential risk of expropriation and on the other hand thanks to their long stay in the village 
have more possibilities than more recent migrants to obtain formal land titles. 
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analyzing the behavior of households at the plot level and not at the village level. This also allows 
to deal with the fact that in a village in which land rights exist not necessarily all households have 
such land titles, and even within households there are often titled and non-titled plots.  After having 
established the link between land titles and expenditures for and investment in agricultural 
technologies, we will go back to our village level data to link this part of the analysis with the 
previous part. More precisely, we will show that heterogeneity in investment in terraces and 
irrigation systems and in the adoption of fertilizer across villages can be explained by differences in 
migration patterns that, in turn, seem to explain an important part of the variance in land titling. 
When examining the plot-level, we look at two types of expenditures and investments. First 
expenditures in land quality and land fertility which we measure by expenditures made for land 
preparation, seeds and planting, fertilizer, pesticides and irrigation. These are generally more short-
term investments which pay out within a year or two, or sometimes even within a single planting 
season.  Second, the planting of cocoa and coffee trees, which entail a significant amount of 
investment costs in form of labor, expenses for land preparation and forgone earnings in the short 
term. The latter is due to the fact that these trees start producing beans only after three to five years. 
For both types of investment land rights may matter through all three channels discussed in Section 
2. In all 13 villages covered by the household survey data, credit programs are available now and 
were available during the past 20 years. And indeed, Nuryartono, Schwarze and Zeller (2004) report 
that titled land is frequently used as collateral in this region. Credits are in principle not only 
important for longer term investments but also for expenditures for seeds, fertilizer and pesticides, 
as these typically have to be paid up-front, i.e. before the harvest.  We would expect, however, that 
these effects of titling on investment are larger and more important for the choice of planting 
perennial crops than for land preparation expenditures, as particularly the assurance and 
realizability effect also depend on whether investments yield a return in the long term or not. 
As before, we distinguish between formal government land titles and a broader set of land 
titles including purchase contracts and letters by village leaders and other ‘official titles’. We 
speculate that there is unlikely to be much difference between them when it comes to short-term 
expenditures (such as land preparation expenditures) but the government titles might have a larger 
effect on longer-term investments such as planting of perennial crops.
10
   
To analyze expenditures for land quality and land fertility (in millions of Rupiah), EXP, by 
household j on plot p, we specify a tobit model since for part of the plots no expenditures at all have 
been undertaken (in what follows we omit the village index i).  The model is as follows: 
 EjpEjEjpEjpjpEjp PCREXP  
''* , (3) 
 with 0jpEXP  
if ,0* jpEXP  
*
jpjp EXPEXP    if ,0
* jpEXP  
and where, as before, Rjp, is a binary variable taking the value one if plot p of household j is titled. 
The vector Cjp stands for different types of crops and plants, such as maize, coffee, cocoa, and 
others or whether a plot is left fallow. Pjp is again a vector of plot characteristics such as self-
assessed soil quality, slope of the plot, log distance of the plot from the house of its owner and of 
course log plot size. Given that households own usually several plots, we can also control for 
household random effects, ωEj.
11
 The error term is denoted εEjp. We exclude from this analysis 
paddy rice fields since these fields require very different land investments, compared to fields with 
other crops. 
                                                          
10
 We exclude from the analysis plots which are leased, because depending on the contractual arrangements, the costs 
for inputs may be shared and the incentive structure is probably different from own plots. 
11 A parametric model with fixed instead of random effects cannot be estimated as there does not exist a sufficient 
statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood. 
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To analyze coffee and cocoa tree planting, we estimate the following linear probability fixed-
effects model: 
 COjpCOjCOjpjpCOjp PRCO  
' , (4) 
where the variable COjp is a binary variable which takes the value one if a plot has coffee and cocoa 
trees as a primary or secondary crop. Often plots are used to cultivate different crops and 
households were asked which crop the main or primary crop on each plot is. All plots, including 
paddy rice plots, are used for estimation. The other variables are defined as before, except that in 
Equation (4) we include household specific fixed-effects, νCOj, not random effects as here the 
estimated model is linear. Identification is thus over households which have at least two plots that 
have a different land title status. In our sample 95 percent of all plots belong to households which 
have more than one plot. 42.0 percent of these plots (554 plots) have a counterpart with a different 
land title status if the broader set of land titles is used. If we stick to official government titles only, 
this percentage declines to 33.4 percent (440 plots). To test the robustness of our results, we also 
estimate a probit model with random effects. 
There are at least three potential reasons why the identification of the effect of land rights on 
investment might pose a problem, but we think that our estimation strategy deals with these 
problems quite satisfactorily. First, a bias may arise because farmers may register more often plots 
that have a higher productivity and these get also higher investments. Given that we control for a 
large number of plot characteristics, we think that this source of bias is not a serious problem in our 
case. We cannot think of a plausible reason why two plots of the same quality within the same 
household get different investments for another reason other than a difference in the land tenure 
status. Second, a bias may arise because more profitable farms, and thus farms with higher 
investments, make it easier to bear the costs of land registration. Again, we think we can deal with 
this problem, since our estimations include household fixed effects, so we control for the overall-
profitability of the farm. Third, a bias may arise because investments such as tree planting are 
undertaken to enhance tenure security. Here again, we think that the inclusion of household fixed-
effects and controls for plot characteristics can solve this problem to a large extent. It is not obvious 
why a farmer would invest in only one out of two plots of the same quality to enhance tenure 
security. But more importantly, investment to enforce property rights may be more relevant for 
customary land rights as shown in the discussion on this relationship in African settings (e.g. 
Besley, 1995; Braselle et al. 2002), but less for formal land titles that we analyze.  
Lastly, one might still be worried about the possibility that commercial tree planting and 
getting land rights are simultaneous decisions. We think even if that was the case, it would not 
contradict our main hypothesis which is that land rights enhance tree planting. If household chose 
tree planting and land rights together then this happens because they think the land rights increase 
the expected return from the tree. If land rights were not accessible, households may not want to 
plant commercial trees. 
If indeed our household-fixed-effects estimator can deal with the above-mentioned 
endogeneity problems, which would all lead, if not addressed, to an overestimation of the effect of 
land rights, then the only remaining source of bias is measurement error in land titling. 
Measurement error may occur if our two binary land title variables do not capture the full 
heterogeneity in rights which may exist. Measurement error would downwardly bias our estimate; 
hence in this sense our results would constitute a lower benchmark.  
As a further approach to address endogeneity, we also present in addition an instrumental 
variable approach in the crop choice estimation. Partly following Besley (1995), we use the 
following two instruments: (1) the number of years since the plot was taken into cultivation the first 
time and (2) whether the owner is the first owner of this plot. For both variables one can argue that 
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they have an influence on whether a plot is titled but that they have not a direct impact on 
investment decisions, or influence investment decisions only through their impact on land rights.
12
 
Table 5 shows the results for the regressions looking at land preparation expenditures. In line 
with our hypothesis, we find that in all three specifications and for both types of land titles, tenure 
security is associated with higher land preparation expenditures on plots (see cols. (1) to (6)). This 
result does also hold if we run the regression only on the sub-sample of non-migrants (results not 
shown in Table). Thus we can exclude the possibility that our result is only driven by migrants’ 
land titles and investments. We do not find a significant difference between the effects of the 
broader definition of land titles and government titles.  This is as we might expect since it is likely 
that in the short term, the value of these titles for the three effects is quite similar. The order of 
magnitude of the estimated effects suggests that on titled plots expenditures are higher by 70 
percent to 100 percent. The effects are somewhat larger if we do not control for the types of crops 
planted. This suggests that if the type of crops is not controlled the effect of land titles is a bit 
overestimated. Including crop choices leads, however, to a potential simultaneity problem. Hence, 
both estimates – with and without the crop choice controls – can be seen as a lower and upper 
bound of the effect of interest.  
In cols. (7) to (12) we try to circumvent this simultaneity problem by estimating the model for 
cocoa and coffee trees together but without all other crops (cols. (7) to (8)) and for both crops 
separately (cols. (9) to (12)). For coffee trees the estimated effect is insignificant, but for the two 
other specifications the association between land rights and land expenditures is clearly positive and 
significant. The variance of the estimated coefficient across different specifications varies a bit but 
overall is consistent with the estimates discussed above.  
[please insert Table 5] 
Table 6 shows the results for the analysis of cocoa and coffee tree planting. Again, we find a 
substantial positive and significant effect of both types of land titles.  As expected, the point 
estimate is always larger for government titles (rather than all land titles). It could suggest that for 
longer-term investments, government titles are more important, but the difference between both 
coefficients is not statistically different.
13
 Our results also hold if we use a probit model instead of a 
linear probability model (columns (3) and (4)). It also holds if we use only the sub-sample of non-
migrants for estimation (not shown). The specification with the full set of explanatory variables 
suggests that land titles increase the probability of tree planting by 15 to 19 percent (columns (5) 
and (6)). The effects are very similar if we exclude paddy rice plots from the sample. This may 
matter because planting trees on such plots means land conversion (results again not presented in 
Table). If we instrument land titles, as described above, we still find a significant effect, but the 
estimation coefficients become relatively large (columns (7) and (8)).
14
 Overall we conclude from 
this analysis that formal land titles have a (substantial) positive impact on land preparation 
expenditures and on tree planting. 
                                                          
12
 However, these instruments are not totally beyond reproach. If, for example farmers decided to first accumulate 
experience with a particular plot to get precise knowledge about the soil quality and soil characteristics before they 
make specific investments, then (1) would not necessarily satisfy the exclusion restriction. A similar argument may 
apply to (2). If a farmer is not the first owner, he or she may copy investment decisions by previous owners which may 
make such investments more likely, since there is less uncertainty involved. However, with the data set at hand we 
found it difficult to come up with any better instrument.  
13
 Moreover, if we define a variable ‘non-governmental titles’ and exclude from the regression all plots with 
government titles, although the coefficient has the right sign, we do not obtain a significant effect for the ‘non-
government titles variable’, which would also be consistent with the idea that for longer-term investments government 
titles are more important. 
14
 This can either be a sign of strong measurement error in the land rights variable or indicate a weak instrument 
problem. Indeed the F-statistics are just above the critical value of about 10 when land titles are instrumented and 
slightly below when government titles are instrumented. However, when we perform an over-identification test 
exogeneity of the instruments is not rejected.  
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[please insert Table 6] 
Now, we go back to our village level data to link this part of the analysis with the previous 
part by showing that heterogeneity in investment across villages is associated with differences in 
migration patterns that, in turn explain an important part of the variance in land titling. We estimate 
the following equation: 
AitAiitAit RA   , (5) 
where Ait stands for investment in village i at time t, Rit, for the existence of land titles and λi stands 
for village fixed effects. We consider three types of investments: first, the building of terraces for 
paddy rice in villages which have steep slopes; second, the investment in a technical or semi-
technical irrigation system; and, third, the use of improved seeds, fertilizer and pesticides. Both the 
construction of terraces and irrigation systems require substantial resources, hence land titles should 
be potentially relevant because of all three effects discussed above; the assurance effect, the 
realizability effect and the collateralization effect. For the adoption of improved seeds, fertilizer and 
pesticides at least the collateralization effect is relevant, because as explained above such inputs 
have to be financed before harvest. Moreover, although such technologies often lead to a higher 
average return, they also involve more risk. Hence, households that have access to credit may be 
more likely to use such inputs, since they have better possibilities to smooth out income shocks.  To 
deal with the potential endogeneity of land titles in such an investment equation, and to show that 
migration-driven land rights might be a relevant channel, we instrument land titles with migration 
using the specification of column 1 in Table 3 as the first stage (controlling additionally for 
population size).
15
 According to our theoretical considerations in Section 2 and the empirical 
findings presented in Section 4, migration should be relevant. This is also confirmed by the 
corresponding first-stage F-statistics presented in Table 7. Moreover, we assume here that migration 
does not directly affect investment, but this is obviously a very strong assumption.
16
 The results 
show that in each case the existence of land titles is associated with a higher probability in the 
village exists an irrigation system, fertilizer is used and terraces are built. The instrumented effects 
are slightly higher than the non-instrumented ones (not shown), which suggests that reverse 
causality is not the dominating bias here, but that rather unobservables and measurement error 
introduce a downward bias if IV is not used. These results do also hold if we restrict the sample to 
those villages that have land titles established under the PRONA/PRODA framework (which was 
described in Section 3).
17
  
[please insert Table 7] 
 
  
                                                          
15 We additionally include population size to ensure that it is immigration rather than population per se which drives 
the titling which was also investigated in more detail in Table 3 (e.g. columns 3-5).  As shown in the column (2) of 
Table 7, the first stage is nearly identical to column (1) in Table 3.   
16
 One may argue that migration has a direct impact on technology adoption (and not an indirect impact through its 
effect on institutions). Such a link could exist if migrants brought new technologies to the villages. For example, there is 
evidence that Bugis (or Buginese, an ethnically Malay, nomadic tribe from the south-western ‘leg’ of Sulawesi) are well 
experienced in growing coffee. While we do not deny this link — in fact it is complementary to our approach — we 
claim that this is not the dominating force. We tested this link also empirically by estimating a regression of technology 
use on past migration. It turned out that the migration was never significant in these regressions.  
17
 In a  more extensive working paper version, we also investigate to what extent access to extension services might 
affect adoption of new technologies and find that this does not affect the results when included as a regressor which is 
also supported by circumstantial evidence on the role of extension services in the project area (Reference omitted). 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we focus on land tenure institutions and the adoption of formal land titles in Central 
Sulawesi/Indonesia. We explain the adoption of formal land titles at least partly by internal 
migration induced population pressure. Our data is consistent with the idea that increased 
population pressure following migration enhanced the demand for formal land titles that were 
accessible through a land titling scheme supplied by the Government. The demand for formal land 
titles was not limited to migrants; rather to the contrary, the resident population developed a 
significant demand for formal titles. Moreover we find evidence that in villages where such titles 
were in use agricultural inputs were used more intensively and investment, such as tree planting, 
terracing and building ditches and irrigation systems were enhanced. We are unable to quantify by 
how much land titling spurred agricultural development, but the least we can say that land titles 
played a supportive role. These, at least on average, positive effects may have materialized because 
of a favorable context: there were enough agricultural investment opportunities, land titles could be 
used as collateral to take a credit and the formal land tenure system was relatively well managed. 
This does not mean that everyone benefited from this institutional change, some households 
clearly lost once land could be traded. In particular, because poorer households sometimes tended 
hastily to sell their land to cope with shocks but by doing this they lower their long term income 
generation capacity and increase their vulnerability.  
 An interesting open question for further research concerns the causes of migration to these 
villages which set into motion this chain of events studied here.  In a working paper version of this 
paper, we show some descriptive evidence that migration decisions are associated with favorable 
geographic conditions (such as access to infrastructure, land quality, and favorable climatic 
conditions) in the destination villages (Grimm and Klasen, 2009).  As this evidence provides an 
interesting link to the macro-level debates on the role of geographic conditions affecting 
institutional change, this is an issue that deserves further research and analysis.   
 Of course, given the narrow regional focus, we do not pretend to generate findings that are 
valid without further testing beyond this particular context. We believe, however, that the 
interesting aspect in our case is that the supply of land titles was exogenously provided throughout 
the entire observation period including the institutional structures needed to manage formal land 
rights over time. The availability of a demand-driven land titling system seems to have been critical 
for the emergence of land rights and the associated investment and technological change. In fact, 
such a demand-driven approach might be better suited to promote agricultural development than the 
often heavy-handed supply-driven approaches that have tended to fail in the past.  Another 
interesting aspect is that Indonesian policy has been to accommodate and sometimes encourage 
migration which then may have helped, as our data suggests, along the process of endogenous 
titling and technological change. Allowing such migration can thus be critical to set a virtuous chain 
of events in motion. Finally, policy might help along the process in other ways.  
 Apart from the more obvious policies of supporting technological change and investments 
by lowering their costs (through subsidies or extension services), placing further restrictions on 
rainforest conversion (and enforcing them) might actually help the process of establishing land 
rights and then promoting land use intensification outside the rainforest.   
 
Appendix 
[please insert Table A1] 
 
  
 17 
References 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson, 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91 (5): 1369-1401. 
Ali, D.A., K. Deininger and M. Goldstein, 2011. Environmental and Gender Impacts of Land 
Tenure Regularization in Africa. Pilot Evidence from Rwanda. UNU-WIDER Working Paper 
#2011/74, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki. 
Bandiera, O., 2007. Land Tenure, Investment Incentives, and the Choice of Techniques: Evidence 
from Nicaragua. World Bank Economic Review, 21 (3): 487-508. 
Besley, T., 1995. Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana. 
Journal of Political Economy, 103 (5): 903-937. 
Boserup, E., 1965. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth – The Economics of Agrarian Change 
under Population Pressure. London: George Allen and Unwin.  
Brassselle, A.-S., F. Gaspart and J.-P. Platteau, 2002. Land tenure security and investment 
incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso. Journal of Development Economics, 67: 
373-418. 
Bromley, D.W. 2008. Formalising property relations in the developing world: The wrong 
prescription for the wrong malady, Land Use Policy, 26: 20-27. 
Bruce, J.W., 1986. Land Tenure Issues in Project Design and Strategies for Agricultural 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. LTC Paper No. 128, Madison, W1: University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, Land Tenure Center. 
Bruce, J.W., 1988. A Perspective on Indigenous Land Tenure Systems and Land Concentration, in 
R.E. Downs and S.P. Reyna (eds.), Land and Society in Contemporary Africa (pp. 23-52). 
Hanover, NH and London: University Press of New England. 
Bruce, J.W., 1993. Do Indigenous Tenure Systems Constrain Agricultural Development?, in T.J. 
Bassett and D.E. Crummey (eds.), Land in African Agrarian Systems (pp. 35-56). Madison, 
W1: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
Deininger, K. and S. Jin, 2003. The Impact of Property Rights on Households’ Investment, Risk 
Coping, and Policy Preferences. Evidence from China. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 51 (4): 851-882. 
Deininger, K. and S. Jin, 2007. Securing Property Rights in Transition: Lessons from 
Implementation of China’s Rural Land Contracting Law. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper # 4447, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Deininger, K., S. Jin and H.K. Nagarajan, 2007. Land Reforms,Poverty Reduction, and Economic 
Growth: Evidence from India, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper # 4448, World 
Bank, Washington D.C. 
Deininger, K., D.A. Ali and T. Alemu, 2011. Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, 
Investment, and Land Markets. Evidence from Ethiopia. Land Economics, 87 (2): 312-334.  
Do, Q.-T. and L. Iyer, 2008. Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 56: 531-579. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine, 2003. Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments influence 
economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (1): 3-39. 
 18 
Engerman, S.L. and K.L. Sokoloff, 1997. Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths 
of Growth among New World Economies. In S. Haber (ed.) How Latin America Fell Behind. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Erasmi, S. and J. Priess, 2007. Satellite and survey data: a multiple source approach to study 
regional land cover / land use change in Indonesia. In: F. Dickmann (ed.), Geovisualisierung 
in der Humangeographie. Kartographische Schriften13: 101-114, Bonn: Kirschbaum Verlag. 
Faust, H, M. Maertens, R. Weber, N. Nuryartono, T. van Rheenen, and R. Birner, 2003. Does 
Migration lead to Destabilization of Forest Margins? STORMA Discussion Paper Series No. 
11, STORMA, University of Göttingen. 
Feder, G., 2007. Land Ownership Security and Farm Productivity: Evidence from Thailand. Journal 
of Development Studies, 24 (1): 16-30. 
Feder, G. and D. Feeny, 1991. Land tenure and property rights: Theory and implications for 
Development Policy. World Bank Economic Review 50 (5): 1245-1277. 
Feder, G. A. Nishio, 1999.The Benefits of Land Registration and Titling: Economic and Social 
Perspectives. Land Use Policy 15 (1): 143-169. 
Galor, O., O. Moav and D. Vollrath, 2009. Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-
Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence. Review of Economic Studies, 76: 
143-179. 
Goldstein, M. and C. Udry, 2008. The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in 
Ghana. Journal of Political Economy, 116 (6): 981-1022.  
Grimm, M. and S. Klasen, 2009, Endogenous institutional change and economic development: A 
micro-level analysis of transmission channels. Courant Research Center Working Paper #14, 
University of Göttingen. 
Hall, R.E. and C.I. Jones, 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per 
Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1): 83-116. 
Hayami, Y. and V.W. Ruttan, 1985. Agricultural Development. 2
nd
 ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Hill, H., 2000. The Indonesian Economy since 1966. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Holden, S.T., K. Deininger and H. Ghebru, 2009. Impacts of Low-Cost Land Certification on 
Investment and Productivity. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91 (2): 359-373.  
Jacoby, H.G. and B. Minten, 2007. Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa Cost-Effective? Evidence 
from Madagascar. World Bank Economic Review, 21 (3): 461-485. 
Klasen, S., J. Priebe, R. Rudolf, 2013. Cash crop choice and income dynamics in rural areas: 
evidence for post-crisis Indonesia. Agricultural Economics, 44, 349-364.  
Maertens, M., M. Zeller and R. Birner, 2006. Sustainable agricultural intensification in forest 
frontier areas. Agricultural Economics, 34: 197-2006. 
Migot-Adholla, S., P. Hazell, B. Blarel and F. Place, 1991. Indigenous Land rights Systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A constraint on Productivity? World Bank Economic Review 5 (1): 155-175. 
 19 
Mundlak, Y., D.F. Larson and R. Butzer, 2002. Determinants of Agricultural Growth in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2803, World 
Bank, Washington D.C.  
North, D.C., 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York and London: W.W: 
Norton & Company. 
Nuryartono, N., 2005. Impact of smallholders' access to land and credit markets on technology 
adoption and land use decisions: the case of tropical forest margins in Central Sulawesi-
Indonesia. PhD dissertation, University of Göttingen. 
Nuryartono, N., S. Schwarze and M. Zeller, 2004. Smallholders access to credit and its impact on 
the adoption of agricultural technology: Evidence and lessons from agriculture practices in the 
Vicinity of the Lore Lindu National Park, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. Mimeo, Institute of 
Rural Development, University of Göttingen. 
Otsuka, K., A.R. Quisumbing, E. Payongayong and J.B. Aidoo, 2003. Land Tenure and the 
Management of Land and Trees: the Case of Customary Land Tenure Areas of Ghana. 
Environmental and Development Economics, 8: 77-104. 
Place, F., 2009. Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Economics Literature and Recent Policy Strategies and Reforms. World Development, 37 
(8): 1326-1336. 
Place, F. and P. Hazell, 1993. Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75 (1): 10-19. 
Platteau, J.P., 1996. The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
critical Assessment. Development and Change, 27: 29-86.  
Platteau, J.P., 2000. Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Quisumbing, A. and K. Otsuka, 2001. Land, Trees, and Women. Washington D.C.: International 
Food Policy Research Institute. 
Reering, G. and J-L van Gender, 2010. Land titling, perceived tenure security, and housing 
consolidation in the kampongs of Bandung, Indonesia, Habitat International, 34: 78-85 
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian and F. Trebbi, 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over 
Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9: 131-
165. 
Safitri, M., 2009. The mystery of formalising informal land tenure in the forest frontier: The case of 
Langkawana, Lampung, Indonesia. In Ubink, J., A. Hoekma and W. Assies (eds.) Legalizing 
Land Rights. Leiden: Leiden University Press. 
Sjaastad E. and D.W. Bromley, 1997. Indigenous Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Appropriation, Security, and Investment Demand. World Development, 25(4):549–62. 
Sjaastad E. and D.W. Bromley, 2000. The Prejudices of Property Rights: On Individualism, 
Specificity, and Security in Property Regimes. Development Policy Review, 18: 365-389. 
Slaats, H. E. Rajagukguk, N. Elmiyah, A. Safik, 2009. Land law in Indonesia. In Ubink, J., A. 
Hoekma and W. Assies (eds.) Legalizing Land Rights. Leiden: Leiden University Press. 
 20 
Schwarze S., S. Erasmi, J. Priess and M. Zeller, 2009. Do National Parks reduce deforestation? The 
effectiveness of the Lore-Lindu National Park in Indonesia. Project on Stability of Rainforest 
Margins - STORMA. Mimeo, University of Göttingen. 
Timmer, C.P., 2007. A Historical Perspective on Pro-Poor Growth in Indonesia. In M. Grimm, S. 
Klasen and A. McKay (eds.), Determinants of Pro-Poor Growth. Analytical Issues and 
Findings from Country Cases, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Van den Broeck, K.. C. Newman and F. Tarp (2007), Land Titles and Rice Production in Vietnam. 
TEP Working Paper #1207, Trinity College Dublin. 
Zeller, M., S. Schwarze and T. van Rheenen, 2002. Statistical Sampling Frame and Methods Used 
for the Selection of Villages and Households in the Scope of the Research Program on 
Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia. STORMA Discussion Paper Series No. 1, 
STORMA, University of Göttingen. 
 
  
 21 
Tables 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics of village-level variables of interest (village survey) 
 
Variable 1980 1990 1995 2001 2001 
(sub-sample) 
Basic characteristics      
Population size 733 912 987 1102 1549 
 (693) (826) (857) (876) (996) 
Size agricultural land (ha) 338 374 436 514 572 
 (270) (310) (358) (398) (424) 
Share of land allocated to  0.417 0.443 0.431 0.410 0.362 
paddy rice (0.317) (0.311) (0.312) (0.302) (0.290) 
Share of land allocated to coconuts,  0.252 0.305 0.389 0.459 0.472 
cocoa and coffee (0.199) (0.204) (0.229) (0.248) (0.234) 
Share of land allocated to 0.176 0.129 0.082 0.052 0.050 
other crops (0.242) (0.202) (0.155) (0.110) (0.103) 
Primary school in village 0.857 0.961 n.a. 0.987 0.923 
Drinking water system in village 0.416 0.455 n.a. 0.896 1.000 
Health facility in village 0.169 0.338 n.a. 0.442 0.385 
Percentage of stone   0.054 0.125 0.214 0.317 0.371 
houses in village (0.107) (0.180) (0.235) (0.303) (0.320) 
      
Demographic dynamics      
Annual population growth (relative to   0.023 0.021 0.021 0.030 
previous period)  (0.024) (0.018) (0.037) (0.049) 
Annual net immigration rate (relative   0.022 0.012 0.014 0.072 
to previous period)  (0.130) (0.071) (0.100) (0.190) 
Share of migrants 0.151 0.150 0.176 0.146 0.161 
 (0.283) (0.254) (0.271) (0.215) (0.120) 
Population density (population 1.237 1.488 1.652 1.829 2.067 
per used and unused agric. land)) (0.909) (1.047) (1.173) (1.187) (1.291) 
      
Land distribution and land titles      
Formal land titles in village 0.091 0.351 0.403 0.636 0.846 
Percentage of households     0.260 0.270 
with formal land titles    (0.220) (0.168) 
Conflicts about land among native 
households    
0.714 
(0.455) 
0.769 
(0.439) 
Conflicts about land between native     0.234 0.462 
people  and migrants    (0.426) (0.519) 
Further expansion of     0.416 0.462 
paddy rice fields possible    (0.496) (0.519) 
      
Technology use      
Irrigation system
a)
  0.200 0.329 0.371 0.514 0.667 
Use of fertilizer 0.403 0.584 0.649 0.727 0.846 
Use of pesticides 0.455 0.636 0.753 0.948 1.000 
Use of improved seeds 0.286 0.416 0.545 0.870 0.923 
Building of terraces
 b)
 0.065 0.217 0.283 0.522 0.571 
      
Number of villages 77 77 77 77 13 
      
Standard deviations in parentheses. The sub-sample (last column) refers to the sample of 13 villages, which were 
covered by the household survey. 
a)
 Villages with paddy rice fields only. 
b)
 Villages with fields on slopes only. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics of household-level variables of interest (household survey) 
 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. 
Household level information (n=318)   
Age household (HH) head 44.155 (12.531) 
HH head male (=1) 0.761  
HH head primary educ. completed 0.635  
HH head migrant 0.390  
HH head’s parents migrants 0.063  
HH head’s grandparents migrants 0.016  
   
Plot level information (n=1326)   
Average number of plots per household 4.170 (2.243) 
Crop choices    
Paddy rice 0.134  
Maize 0.090  
Coffee (as primary or secondary crop) 0.162  
Cocoa (as primary or secondary crop) 0.352  
Fallow 0.075  
Land acquisition   
Heritage 0.289  
Purchase 0.233  
Clearing forest 0.170  
Gift 0.053  
Other (e.g. marriage) 0.063  
Plots with land titles 0.336  
Of which   
Government titles 0.434  
Purchasing contract  0.112  
Letter from the village chief 0.227  
Other letter 0.121  
Other type of title 0.106  
First plot owner 0.750  
Years since plot is in cultivation 20.741 (17.215) 
Soil quality (self-assessed)   
Less fertile soils 0.025  
Medium fertile soils 0.321  
Fertile soils 0.494  
Missing 0.160  
Plot size in ares  65.8 (222.3) 
Distance plot–house walk. min. 25.2 (52.7) 
Slope of plots   
Plot not on slope  0.688  
Plot on slope of 0-15° 0.115  
Plot on slope of 15-25° 0.064  
Plot on slope of 25-35° 0.063  
Plot on slope of 35-45° 0.070  
Land preparation expend. (in 1000 Rupees) 963 (3667) 
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Table 3 The effect of immigration on the existence of formal land titles (village level)  
linear probability fixed-effects model, dependant variable: in village exist formal land titles (= 1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
†
 
Net immigration rate 0.435 (1.84*) 0.636 (1.95*) 0.437 (1.84*)   0.411 (1.70*)   
Future net immigration rate           -0.615 (–2.53**) 
Population growth rate       -0.180 (–0.17)     
Population density     0.027 (0.29) 0.033 (0.29) 0.027 (0.28) -0.007 (–0.08) 
Health facility in village    –0.164 (–0.91)         
Primary school in village   0.285 (0.88)         
Drinking water system in 
village 
  
0.040 (0.38) 
  
    
  
Share cash crop fields          0.201 (0.68)   
Share paddy rice fields         0.154 (0.40)   
Year 1990 Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Year 1995 0.053 (1.20)   0.048 (1.03) 0.042 (0.86) 0.033 (0.63) 0.262 (5.19***) 
Year 2001 0.289 (6.57***) 0.275 (3.86***) 0.279 (5.08***) 0.273 (4.53***) 0.253 (3.73***) 0.318 (5.39***) 
Constant 0.350 (11.09***) 0.113 (0.35) 0.309 (2.14**) 0.314 (1.95*) 0.182 (0.66) 0.112 (0.95) 
             
Fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
             
Observations 231  154  231  231  231  231  
Number of villages 77  77  77  77  77  77  
R
2
 (within) 0.260  0.329  0.260  0.243  0.262  0.306  
             
The net immigration rate and population growth rate refer to the periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2001. The regressions including infrastructure variables as regressors 
cover only the periods 1980-1990 and 1995-2001, therefore column (2) does only include 154 village-year observations. Cash crops include coconuts, coffee and cocoa (this 
definition refers to the primary crop on a field). 
† 
In column (6) we regress the existence of formal land titles in t on migration between t and t+1.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 The effect of migration and migrant status on the prevalence of formal land titles (household-plot level) 
probit model, dependent variable: plot is titled (= 1) 
 
 All households Non-migrant households All households 
   Government land   Government land   Government land 
 Land Titles Titles Land Titles titles Land Titles titles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age household (HH) head 0.088 (2.65***) 0.058 (2.14**) 0.071 (1.61) 0.053 (1.14) 0.089 (2.77***) 0.056 (2.03**) 
Age HH head squared/ / 100 -0.075 (-2.21**) -0.055 (-2.12**) -0.063 (-1.35) -0.042 (-0.89) -0.077 (-2.33**) -0.053 (-2.00**) 
HH head male (=1) -0.502 (-1.40) -0.039 (-0.12) -0.284 (-0.68) 0.427 (1.19) -0.476 (-1.26) 0.014 (0.04) 
HH head primary educ. 
Completed 0.591 (3.18***) 0.717 (4.10***) 0.626 (2.62***) 0.697 (2.97***) 0.617 (3.21***) 0.777 (4.40***) 
HH head migrant 0.451 (3.10***) 0.135 (0.89)     0.517 (3.53***) 0.192 (1.21) 
HH head’s parents migrants -0.334 (-1.31) -0.163 (-0.68)     -0.291 (-1.16) -0.138 (-0.56) 
HH head’s grandparents 
migrants 0.645 (1.72*) 1.179 (2.88***)     0.815 (2.02***) 1.452 (3.18***) 
Share of migrants in village 1.210 (2.14**) 1.266 (2.21**) 1.180 (1.74*) 1.132 (1.71*) 0.983 (1.70*) 1.205 (2.02**) 
Less fertile soils         Ref.  Ref  
Medium fertile soils         -0.298 (-1.17) 0.088 (0.28) 
Fertile soils         0.050 (0.21) 0.304 (1.02) 
Log plot size in ares          -0.035 (-1.20) -0.105 (-2.74***) 
Constant -3.164 (-3.63***) -3.446 (-4.20***) -2.918 (-2.54**) -3.870 (-3.09***) -2.977 (-3.34***) -3.311 (-3.66***) 
             
Number of plots 1326  1326  808  808  1326  1326  
Number of households 318  318  194  194  318  318  
Pseudo R
2
 0.073  0.077  0.057  0.072  0.098  0.108  
             
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors adjusted for clustering of households within villages; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We 
included a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the self-assessed soil quality variable was missing. 
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Table 5 The effect of land titling on investment in plots, (household-plot level) 
tobit household random-effects model, dependent variable: land preparation expenditures (in millions of Rupees) 
 
 (1) 
All crops 
(2) 
All crops 
(3) 
All crops 
(4) 
All crops 
(5) 
All crops 
(6) 
All crops 
Land titles 1.706 (2.94***)   2.136 (3.37***)   1.823 (2.99***)   
Government land titles   1.400 (1.83*)   2.277 (2.77***)   1.582 (1.97**) 
Log plot size in ares 2.393 (9.22***) 2.416 (9.31***) 2.218 (7.43***) 2.222 (7.46***) 2.062 (6.93***) 2.080 (7.00***) 
Other crops Ref.  Ref.      Ref.  Ref.  
Maize 4.852 (5.96***) 4.852 (5.97***)     4.370 (5.35***) 4.372 (5.36***) 
Coffee -0.023 (-0.03) 0.111 (0.17)     -0.127 (-0.19) 0.046 (0.07) 
Cocoa 4.690 (7.61***) 4.690 (7.57***)     4.727 (7.55***) 4.716 (7.50***) 
Plot is fallow -2.497 (-2.02**) -2.470 (-2.00**) -5.883 (-4.77***) -5.832 (-4.74***) -2.603 (-2.08**) -2.550 (-2.04**) 
Less fertile soils         Ref.  Ref.  
Medium fertile soils     3.306 (1.47) 3.212 (1.42) 3.096 (1.35) 3.055 (1.32) 
Fertile soils     3.369 (1.52) 3.345 (1.50) 2.958 (1.30) 2.994 (1.31) 
Log dist. plot–house min.     0.619 (2.47**) 0.684 (2.68***) 0.575 (2.35**) 0.612 (2.48**) 
Plot not on slope          Ref.  Ref.  
Plot on slope of 0-15°     2.208 (2.77***) 1.963 (2.48**) 1.888 (2.42**) 1.637 (2.12**) 
Plot on slope of 15-25°     -0.870 (-0.84) -1.012 (-0.98) -0.766 (-0.76) -0.964 (-0.96) 
Plot on slope of 25-35°     -2.105 (-1.66*) -2.482 (-1.97**) -2.213 (-1.79*) -2.612 (-2.13**) 
Plot on slope of 35-45°     -1.622 (-1.44) -1.819 (-1.63*) -1.494 (-1.35) -1.750 (-1.60) 
Constant -16.954 (-13.57***) -16.664 (-13.47) -18.488 (-7.45***) -18.069 (-7.30***) -20.229 (-7.90***) -19.866 (-7.75***) 
             
Random effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
             
Number of plots 1148  1148  1148  1148  1148  1148  
Number of households 317  317  317  317  317  317  
             
(Table continues next page) 
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Table 5 (… continued) 
 
 (7) 
Coffee and cocoa 
(8) 
Coffee and cocoa 
(9) 
Coffee 
(10) 
Coffee 
(11) 
Cocoa 
(12) 
Cocoa 
Land titles 1.916 (1.77*)   1.221 (0.58)   2.377 (2.08**)   
Government land titles   2.618 (2.03**)   2.305 (0.96)   2.600 (1.96**) 
Log plot size in ares 3.437 (5.86***) 3.431 (5.91***) 3.881 (3.41***) 3.776 (3.36***) 3.641 (5.85***) 3.629 (5.87***) 
Coffee 7.464 (3.98***) 7.072 (3.81***)         
Cocoa 0.190 (2.01**) 0.173 (1.84*)         
Age of trees (years)     -0.267 (-2.42**) -0.262 (-2.43**) 0.520 (4.04***) 0.495 (3.86***) 
Less fertile soils             
Medium fertile soils 1.692 (0.42) 1.766 (0.44) 32.444 (0.04) 31.777 (0.04) 0.807 (0.20) 0.926 (0.23) 
Fertile soils 1.614 (0.41) 1.668 (0.43) 34.639 (0.04) 34.013 (0.05) 0.406 (0.10) 0.548 (0.14) 
Log dist. plot–house min. 0.752 (1.75) 0.868 (2.01**) -0.216 (-0.30) -0.108 (-0.15) 0.941 (2.04**) 1.048 (2.26**) 
Plot not on slope      Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Plot on slope of 0-15° 2.366 (1.90*) 2.155 (1.77*) 7.109 (2.93***) 6.959 (2.94***) 1.888 (1.44) 1.622 (1.27) 
Plot on slope of 15-25° -2.400 (-1.43) -2.381 (-1.43) -2.038 (-0.54) -1.801 (-0.49) -1.565 (-0.90) -1.650 (-0.96) 
Plot on slope of 25-35° -1.688 (-0.82) -1.990 (-0.99) 3.554 (0.99) 3.362 (0.98) -1.909 (-0.87) -2.396 (-1.12) 
Plot on slope of 35-45° -2.251 (-1.19) -2.195 (-1.17) 1.023 (0.31) 1.179 (0.37) -1.839 (-0.94) -1.859 (-0.96) 
Constant -29.284 (-6.03***) -28.813 (-6.01***) -55.623 (-0.07) -54.706 (-0.08) -23.602 (-5.31***) -23.268 (-5.27***) 
             
Random effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
             
Number of plots 462  462  183  183  394  394  
Number of households 236  236  124  124  222  222  
             
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors adjusted for clustering of plots within households; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We included 
a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the self-assessed soil quality variable was missing. On some plots both coffee and cocoa trees are cultivated. 
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Table 6 The effect of land titling on investment in plots (household-plot level) 
linear probability household fixed-effects model and probit random-effects model, dependent variable: planted 
cocoa or coffee trees 
 
 LP model LP model Probit model Probit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Land titles 0.222  (4.49***)   0.244 (2.53***)    
Government land titles   0.274  (5.12***)   0.597 (4.84***)  
         
Fixed effects  yes  yes      
Random effects     yes  yes  
         
Constant 0.404 (18.28***) 0.439 (27.48***) -0.130 (2.16**) -0.135 (2.55**) 
         
Number of plots 1135  1135  1135  1135  
Number of households 310  310  310  310  
         
 
 LP model LP model IV-LP model IV-LP model 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Land titles 0.156 (3.16**)       
Government land titles   0.187 (3.39***)     
Land titles IV     1.174 (3.55***)   
Government land titles IV       1.759 (3.28***) 
Log plot size in ares -0.088 (4.76***) -0.090 (4.89***) -0.059 (2.35) -0.070 (2.45**) 
Less fertile soils Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Medium fertile soils -0.007 (0.07) -0.007 (0.06) 0.023 (0.18) 0.034 (0.21) 
Fertile soils 0.078 (0.70) 0.081 (0.73) 0.046 (0.38) 0.060 (0.39) 
Log dist. plot–house (min) -0.011 (0.70) -0.003 (0.17) 0.015 (0.70) 0.100 (2.42**) 
Plot not on slope  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Plot on slope of 0-15° 0.294 (5.07***) 0.281 (4.87***) 0.366 (5.18***) 0.267 (3.49***) 
Plot on slope of 15-25° 0.325 (4.41**) 0.320 (4.35***) 0.364 (3.42***) 0.332 (2.90***) 
Plot on slope of 25-35° 0.178 (2.16**) 0.168 (2.03**) 0.189 (1.92*) 0.089 (0.74) 
Plot on slope of 35-45° 0.185 (2.39**) 0.178 (2.30**) 0.196 (2.17**) 0.133 (1.22) 
         
Fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
         
Constant 0.653 (5.39***) 0.670 (5.59***)     
         
Number of plots 1135  1135  1135  1135  
Number of households 310  310  310  310  
         
First-Stage F-statistic     12.56  8.97  
Sargan statistic     0.006  0.008  
             p-value     0.939  0.927  
         
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors adjusted for clustering of plots within households; * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We included a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the self-
assessed soil quality variable was missing. 
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Table 7 The effect of land titling on agricultural investment (village level) 
linear probability fixed-effects IV model, dependent variable: in village exists irrigation system (= 1), are 
improved seeds, pesticides and fertilizer used (=1), are terraces built (=1) respectively 
 
 Irrigation
 a)
 Fertilizer Terraces
 b)
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Land titles (instrumented) 0.543 1.017 3.688 
 (3.53***) (5.49***) (5.31***) 
Fixed-effects yes yes yes 
    
N 202 227 138 
    
First-stage regressions  
Net immigration rate 0.503 0.435 0.434 
 (2.05**) (1.84*) (1.57) 
Ln pop. -0.021 0.084 0.444 
 (-0.12) (0.50) (1.71*) 
Year 1990 Ref. Ref. Ref. 
    
Year 1995 0.066 0.044 0.015 
 (1.3) (0.92) (0.23) 
Year2001 0.303 0.269 0.210 
 (4.9***) (4.59***) (2.7***) 
First-Stage F-statistic 11.9 12.9 9.4 
 Sargan statistic 3.78 10.10 6.41 
             p-value 0.286 0.018 0.093 
    
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
a)
 Information 
about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
b)
 Terraces are only relevant for villages with 
steep slopes. Therefore the sample sizes are slightly smaller and the first-stage regressions in columns (1) and (3) 
show slightly different results from Table 3. 
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Table A1 The effect of immigration on the existence of formal land titles (village level)  
probit model, dependent variable: in village exist formal land titles in 2001 (= 1)  
tobit model, dependent variable: share of household in village having formal land titles in 2001 
 
 Probit model 
(1) 
Probit model 
(2) 
Probit model 
(3) 
Probit model 
(4) 
Probit model 
(5) 
Tobit model 
(6) 
 
Share of migrants in 2001 2.426 (1.91*)         0.326 (1.97*) 
Conflicts about land in the 
past (=1)   0.725 (1.79*)  
  
 
  
  
Further expansion of paddy 
rice fields possible in 2001     –0.700 (–2.18**) 
 
 
  
  
Gini coefficient of land 
distribution in 2001       1.766 (1.93*) 1.305 (1.35)   
Population density in 2001 0.060 (0.39) 0.174 (1.20) 0.042 (0.29)   0.071 (0.49) 0.004 (0.11) 
Share other fields in 2001 Ref.  Ref.  Ref.    Ref.  Ref.  
Share cash crop fields in 1.459 (1.20) 1.412 (1.18) 1.830 (1.62)   1.590 (1.38) 0.248 (0.89) 
2001             
Share paddy rice fields in 1.891 (1.79*) 1.541 (1.49) 2.234 (2.29**)   1.755 (1.76*) 0.369 (1.59) 
2001             
Constant –1.467 (–1.50) –1.801 (–1.71*) –1.150 (–1.22) –0.250 (–0.74) –1.661 (–1.69*) –0.241 (–1.03) 
             
Number of villages 77  77  77  77  77  77  
Pseudo-R
2
  0.107  0.095  0.107  0.039  0.078  0.121  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Cash crops include coconuts, coffee and cocoa (this definition refers to the 
primary crop on a field). 
 
